History of Phrenology on the Web

Organs

George Combe's A System of Phrenology, 5th edn, 2 vols. 1853.

Vol. 1: [front matter], Intro, N ervous system, Principles of Phrenology, Anatomy of the brain, Division of the faculties 1.Amativeness 2.Philoprogenitiveness 3.Concentrativeness 4.Adhesiveness 5.Combativeness 6.Destructiveness, Alimentiveness, Love of Life 7.Secretiveness 8.Acquisitiveness 9.Constructiveness 10.Self-Esteem 11.Love of Approbation 12.Cautiousness 13.Benevolence 14.Veneration 15.Firmness 16.Conscientiousness 17.Hope 18.Wonder 19.Ideality 20.Wit or Mirthfulness 21.Imitation.
Vol. 2: [front matter], external senses, 22.Individuality 23.Form 24.Size 25.Weight 26.Colouring 27.Locality 28.Number 29.Order 30.Eventuality 31.Time 32.Tune 33.Language 34.Comparison, General observations on the Perceptive Faculties, 35.Causality, Modes of actions of the faculties, National character & development of brain, On the importance of including development of brain as an element in statistical inquiries, Into the manifestations of the animal, moral, and intellectual faculties of man, Statistics of Insanity, Statistics of Crime, Comparative phrenology, Mesmeric phrenology, Objections to phrenology considered, Materialism, Effects of injuries of the brain, Conclusion, Appendices: No. I, II, III, IV, V, [Index], [Works of Combe].

( 407 )

II. MATERIALISM.

Three questions are comprehended under the title of materialism, and merit a distinct consideration. 1st, Of what substance are the minds of living creatures composed ? 2dly, On what does mind depend for existence? and, 3dly, On what is it dependent for the power of manifesting itself in this life?

In regard to the first question, I observe that mind in the abstract has no existence. Individual beings who manifest mind exist, so that the real subject of inquiry is, what constitutes the power which manifests thought and feeling in man and animals ? Many persons maintain that this power inheres in no material substance, but is the attribute of an immaterial spirit alone. When we enquire, however, for the evidence on which their opinion is formed, it is generally admitted that an immaterial essence cannot be seen, tasted, perceived by smell, felt by the hand, or heard. Its existence, therefore, cannot be proved by means of the senses ; and much less can its substance be discovered through their instrumentality. But it is affirmed that we are conscious of the existence of an immaterial spirit within us which thinks and feels. I reply that we are conscious only of thoughts and feelings, but have no consciousness of the substance which thinks and feels. This point is largely discussed in vol. i., from pages 9 to 24, to which I beg leave to refer. Consciousness, then, reveals to us that a Being which thinks and feels does exist, but it is silent concerning its elementary composition. From not adverting to the distinction between being conscious of the existence of a thinking Being, and being conscious of the substance of which it consists, the popular idea probably has arisen that consciousness affords satisfactory evidence that mind, as a spiritual entity, exists independently of matter ; but as we are unconscious of the contraction and relaxation of the muscles, we might as well

408 MATERIALISM.

imagine that our arms and legs are moved, not by material organs, but by the direct impulse of spirit, as entertain the supposition in question. The truly philosophical conclusion is, that, by means of consciousness, we are unable to discover of what the thinking principle is composed.

Again, it is said that matter cannot think and feel. I profess myself incapable of refuting this assertion, because it seems to me, that only God who created matter can tell what it can or cannot do. This proposition begs the whole question, and need not, therefore, be discussed.

Other individuals maintain that the brain is the mind, and that thought and feeling are mere functions performed by it, as motion is a function of the muscles. This class of reasoners possess one advantage,-they are able to prove the concomitance between the existence of the brain and the manifestation of thought and feeling. We must admit to them that in this life we have not seen mind manifested without brain. But there is a. deeper question behind: Causation is discerned only by the reflecting faculties, which, in certain circumstances, may lead us to a conviction of the existence Of something standing towards observed phenomena in the relation of a cause, when they are incapable of predicating any thing concerning the substance of that something. (See vol. ii- p. 175-6.) Indeed, we have no faculties calculated to give us conceptions of substance, even that of familiar objects (see vol. ii. p. 29) ; all that we seem capable of knowing is the existence of objects, and the qualities which they manifest. We see a stone, when unsupported, fall to the ground, and we call the cause of its descent, gravitation ; but this is a name for a mere power manifested by matter, the existence of which power is made known to us by Causality. We can form no conception of the .cause which communicates this power to matter. In like manner, although we should admit that cerebral matter thinks and feels, the question remains, What gives it the power of thinking and feeling ? The spiritualist asserts that an immaterial essence is added to it, which gives it this power'; but, as we have seen, he can adduce no evidence for his opinion. On

MATERIALISM. 409

the other hand, the materialist affirms that the power of thought and feeling inheres in cerebral matter itself. He is right in saying that we see these mental acts manifested by cerebral matter, but then, as we cannot tell what cerebral matter is, much less can we logically predicate what confers on it the power of thinking and feeling. The assertion that this power necessarily inheres in it, could be legitimately maintained only after we knew perfectly its essential nature, which probably God only understands. In the present state of our knowledge this opinion is as completely unsupported by evidence, as the affirmation that it is the addition of an immaterial spirit which confers on cerebral matter the attribute of thought. In short, it appears to me that we cannot, by observation and reason, ascertain what it is that confers on cerebral matter the powers which it manifests.

This argument is very ably stated by the author of " Remarks suggested by the reading of Mr Taylor's Letter to the Lord Provost, &c. of Edinburgh, offering himself as a candidate for the Logic Chair," 1836.-" Philosophers," says he, " are now beginning to discover a glimpse of the truth, that mind and matter, which they have along assumed to be real existences, are only the NAMES, and nothing more than the names, of certain classifications of human ideas ; there being within the scope of man's knowledge no such thing as Matter, independently of the different material objects of human perception, or of the individual elementary particles that compose them ; and there being, on the other hand, no such thing as Mind, independently of the different individual beings that feel, think, and will. To compare, therefore, together Mind and Matter, in the abstract, as antagonist principles, having no common property, as philosophers and theologians have always done, is really, it appears to me, with all deference to the opinions of the great men who have wasted their, energies upon it, one of the most futile operations in which the mind of man can be engaged, for it is a comparison of nonentities. There

410 MATERIALISM.

are no such things as extension, solidity, and resistance, form, size, colour, sound, or smell, different or separate from the material objects that exhibit them ; and all that can be legitimately predicated of them is, that they are attributes, qualities, or properties, not of the abstract essence, or substance, called matter, but simply of the particular stock, stone, pigment, earth, metal, or gas, that is the immediate object of thought." P. 10. " Thought and feeling are, equally with extension and solidity, qualities of concrete beings, and mankind have no knowledge of any other than concrete beings that possess such powers. Reflection, indeed, upon consciousness, has brought thinking men to the conclusion, that their powers of thinking, feeling, and willing, are the attributes, not of their whole being indiscriminately, but of their brain exclusively ; but beyond this their means of inquiry cannot carry them. It is the concrete being lodged within the skull (the concrete being, and not the abstraction called Mind) that feels, thinks, and wills ; but what are the elements that compose that concrete ? and what is the principle or mainspring of its activity ? are questions that no man can answer." P. 14.

The second question is, On what is the power of feeling and thought dependent for existence ? All the knowledge which we possess concerning the nature of this power, is not sufficient to enable us to answer the question. The only response that can philosophically be given, is, that it depends for its existence on the will of the Being who created it.

The third question is, On what is the power of feeling and thought dependent for manifesting itself in this life? It appears to me that facts demonstrate that its capability of manifesting itself in this world depends on the condition of the organization. When, therefore, I say " that the mental qualities and capacities are dependent upon the bodily constitution," the sentence should be completed, " not for existence, but for the power of acting in this material world." This explanation has been frequently stated in the phreno-

MATERIALISM. . 411

logical books ; and it should be remembered,- as its repetition would be tedious.

According to these views, the question of Materialism is one of no practical importance. If the power of manifesting the mind in this life depends on the condition of the corporeal organization, and especially on that of the brain, it follows that, for every state of thought and feeling, there must be a corresponding state of the brain, and that it is impossible for human beings to operate on the minds of-other human beings except through the instrumentality of organs, and subject to the laws imposed by the Creator on the organic system. It will become, therefore, the interest and the duty of all persons to perfect the brain as the means of improving the mental manifestations, equally whether they embrace the spiritual or the material hypothesis. The assumption or denial of the existence of an immaterial spirit, distinct from organization, is the expression of an opinion concerning merely the ultimate cause of the mental manifestations, a point which leads to no practical result, and seems, moreover, to be placed as completely beyond the reach of our faculties as the discovery of the ultimate cause of gravitation. It has been well remarked, that one philosopher may assume the cause of gravitation to be in its nature spiritual, and another, material ; and that yet both, while they remain in this world, will be equally subject to its influence, will equally find it their interest to attend to its operations, and be equally capable of applying its powers to useful purposes : and the same may be predicated in regard to our assumptions concerning the ultimate cause of the mental manifestations.

The objection that Phrenology leads to materialism, however, has been so frequently urged against it in popular forms, that it demands some farther consideration. A few observations will suffice, for it appears singularly unphilosophical, even upon the most superficial consideration. Phrenology, viewed as the assertion of certain physical facts, cannot, if unfounded, logically lead to any result, except the

412 MATERIALISM.

disgrace and mortification of its supporters. On such a supposition, it cannot overturn religion, or any other truth ; because, by the constitution of the human intellect, error constantly tends to resolve itself into nothing, and to sink into oblivion ; while truth, having a real existence, remains permanent and impregnable. In this view, then, the objection, that Phrenology leads to materialism, is absurd. If, on the other hand, the science is held to be a true interpretation of nature, and if it be urged, that, nevertheless, it leads fairly and logically to materialism, then the folly of the objection is equally glaring ; for it resolves itself into this,-that materialism is the constitution of nature, and that Phrenology is dangerous, because it makes this constitution known.

The charge assumes a still more awkward appearance in one shape in which it is frequently brought forward. The objector admits that the mind uses the body as an instrument of communication with external nature, and maintains that this fact does not necessarily lead to materialism. In this I agree with him ; but I cannot perceive how it should lead nearer to this result, to hold that each faculty manifests itself by a particular organ, than to believe that the whole mind acts by means of the whole body, or the whole brain. In short, in whatever point of view Phrenology is regarded, whether as true or false, the objection of materialism is futile and unphilosophical ; and one must regret that it should have been brought forward in the name of religion, because every imbecile and unfounded attack against philosophy, made in this sacred name, tends to diminish the respect with which it should always be invested.

But let us consider more closely the nature and extent of the point in dispute, and of the real effect of our decision upon it. The question, as already mentioned, is, Whether the substance of which the thinking principle is composed be matter or spirit! And the effect of our decision, let it be observed, is not to alter the nature of that substance, whatever it be, but merely to adopt an opinion consonant with, or adverse to, a fact in nature over which we have no control.

MATERIALISM. 413

Mind, with all its faculties and functions, has been manifested by man and animals since the creation, and will be manifested till the races become extinct, and no opinion of ours, concerning the cause of the phenomena, can have the least influence over that cause itself. The mind is invested by nature with all its properties, and these it will possess, and manifest, and maintain, let men think, and speak, and write what they will concerning its substance. If the Author of nature has invested the mind with the quality of endless existence, it will, to a certainty, flourish in immortal youth, in spite of every appearance of premature decay. If, on the other hand, He has limited its existence to this passing scene, and decreed that it shall perish when the animating principle passes from the body, then all our conjectures, arguments, discussions, and assertions, respecting its immortality, will not add one day to its existence. The opinions of man, therefore, concerning the substance of the mind can have no influence whatever in changing or modifying that substance itself; and if so, as little can these opinions undermine the constitution of the mind, or its relations to time and eternity, on which, as their foundations, morality and religion must, and do, rest as on an immutable basis. According to Phrenology, morality and natural religion originate in, and emanate from, the primitive constitution of the mental powers .themselves. Faculties and organs of Benevolence, Hope, Veneration, Justice, and Reflection exist. Now, our believing that the mind will die with the body, will not pluck these sentiments and powers from the soul ; nor can our believing the mind to be immortal implant a single one more of them in our constitution. They would all remain the same in functions and constitution, and render virtue amiable, and vice odious, although we should believe the mind to be made of dust, just as they would do were we to believe it to be a more immediate emanation from the Deity himself.

In short, this question of materialism is one of the most vain, trivial, and uninteresting that ever engaged the human intellect ; and. nothing can be more unphilosophical, and

MATERIALISM. . 415

man ? This brings us to the jet of the question at once. Mr Lawrence, it is said, founds no moral doctrine on his opinions regarding the essence of the mind ; but other materialists, who make these opinions the foundation of atheism, wish us to believe that the best evidence of the Divine intention in creating the human soul, is to be found by discovering the substance of which it is made ; and they insinuate, that, if it be immaterial, the conclusion necessarily follows, that it is intended for magnificent destinies, while, if it be composed of a rude and vulgar stuff, it must be intended only to inhabit this lower world. Here, however, sense and logic equally fail them : for no principle in' philosophy is more certain than that, from all the knowledge which we. are capable of attaining concerning any substance, we can infer nothing touching the end for which it is fitted. Exhibit to a human being every variety of imaginable essence, and if you allow him to know no more of its properties than he can discover from examining its constituent parts, he will be utterly incapable of telling whether it is calculated to endure for a day, or last to eternity. The materialist, therefore, is not entitled, even from the supposed admission that cerebral matter thinks, to conclude that the human being is not immortal. The true way of discovering for what end man has been created, is to look to the qualities with which he has been endowed, trusting that the substance of which he is composed will be found perfectly suited to the objects of his creation. When we inquire into his qualities, we find the thinking principle in him to differ, not only in degree, but in kind, from that of the lower animals. The latter have no faculty of justice, to indicate to them that the unrestrained manifestation of Destructiveness or Acquisitiveness is wrong ; they have no sentiments of Wonder and Veneration to prompt them to seek a God whom they may adore ; they have no faculty of Hope, pointing out futurity as an object of ceaseless contemplation, and leading them to expect a life beyond the grave ; and, indeed, several of the convolutions of the brain, which in man form the organs of

416 MATERIALISM.

these sentiments, appear not to exist in the lower animals. The organs also, which in man serve to manifest the faculties of Reflection, are, in the lower animals, eminently deficient ; and their understanding, in exact correspondence with this fact, is so limited as to be satisfied with little knowledge, and to be insensible to the comprehensive design and glories of creation. Man, then, being endowed with qualities which are denied to the lower creatures, we are entitled, by a legitimate exercise of reflection (the subject being beyond the region of the external senses), to conclude, that he is designed for another and a higher destiny than is to be allotted to them, whatever be the essence of his mind.

These principles enable us to dispose of an objection which was long ago stated by Dr Barclay, and has since been repeated by many other opponents, and yet is in itself very absurd. Dr Barclay's hypothesis is, that the mind fashions the organs. If it is impossible to discover the substance of which the mind is composed, it is equally impracticable to tell whether the faculties determine the size of the organs, or the organs limit the power of the faculties. Some of the difficulties with which Dr Barclay's notions are beset are the following t-If an immaterial mind fashions the organs, then God bestows idiotic minds, insane minds, stupid minds, and viciously disposed minds, on different individuals ; and these make bad organs :-a doctrine which appears fully more objectionable than the theory, that we know nothing of the nature of the ultimate cause of thought and feeling ; but that the manifestations of the mental powers and dispositions, in this life, are affected by the state of the organs. On the former supposition, human efforts can do nothing to ameliorate the condition of the mind ; for the immaterial principle is beyond our reach, and until we modify it, no change in the organs can take place. On the latter hypothesis, we are encouraged with hopes of success to do our best ; for it assumes that the imperfections lie in the organs, which are subject to modification by means of propagation and exercise.

MATERIALISM. 417

According to this view, also, insanity is not a disease of an immaterial principle, but all affection of the organs, which may be cured by medicine. See Phrenological Journal, vol. ii. p. 149.

An extensive discussion of the subject of Materialism will be found in The Phrenological Journal, vol. xv. pp. 87, 294, 315, 343-5-6-7-8, 373-5, and in vol. xvi. p. 40.

III. ON THE EFFECTS OF INJURIES OF THE BRAIN ON THE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE MIND.

In the former Editions of this work, I inserted a treatise on this subject by Dr A. Combe ; but as the best medical authors have now abandoned the objections founded on these injuries, I consider it unnecessary here to repeat Dr Combe's answers. They will be found at full length in the Transactions of the Phrenological Society. I beg to refer also to the Phrenological Journal, vol. xi. p. 331.

© John van Wyhe 1999-2011. Materials on this website may not be reproduced without permission except for use in teaching or non-published presentations, papers/theses.

The History of Phrenology on the Web